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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of a specific commodity tax on output and the location decision of undifferentiated
oligopolistic firms with free entry. It shows that (1) the optimum output and location of the oligopolistic firm is
independent of the specific commodity tax if the demand function is linear (2) an increase in the specific commodity
tax will increase (decrease) output per firm and move the plant location toward (away from) the output market if the
demand function is concave (convex). These results are consistent with the conventional results based on the nonspatial setting. In the case in which the demand function is linear or concave, it shows that the number of firms and
total output of oligopoly may increase. These results are significantly different from the conventional results based on
non-spatial setting. It indicates that the effects of the specific tax on total output and the number of firms crucially
depend upon transport costs and the location decisions of oligopolistic firms.
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1. Introduction
In his famous paper, Commodity Taxation and Imperfect Competition (1989), Besley
investigated the effects of a commodity tax on output per firm, the number of firms and
total output of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms with free entry.
Under the
assumptions that (1) firms are symmetric and identical; (2) firms produce a homogenous
good and make Cournot-Nash conjectures about their rivals’ production decisions; (3)
firms are free to enter and leave the industry; (4) the sufficient second order conditions
and the stability conditions are satisfied, Besley obtained the following propositions.
B1. An increase in the specific commodity tax will increase (decrease) output per firm if
the inverse demand function is concave (convex). Besley (1989, p. 363).
B2. An increase in the specific commodity tax will decrease the number of firms if the
demand function is linear or concave. Besley (1989, p. 363).
B3. An increase in the specific commodity tax will decrease total output. Besley (1989, p.
363).
These results are based on the non-spatial setting in which location and transport costs are
negligible. However, the real economy is characterized by dispersion of consumers and
producers over geographic space with trade between them always incurring transport
costs. It would be interesting and important to investigate the effects of the specific
commodity tax on output per firm, the number of firms and total output of
undifferentiated oligopolistic firms in a spatial setting.
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. It explicitly incorporates oligopolistic
market structure into the Weber triangle and examines the impact of a change in the
specific commodity tax on output and the plant location of undifferentiated oligopolistic
firms. It will be shown that the well-known Besley’s B1 holds but B2 and B3 may not
hold in the oligopolistic location model.
2. An Oligopolistic Location Model
Our analysis is based on the well-known Weber triangular model with the following
assumptions.
(a) N firms employ two transportable inputs (m1 and m2) located at A and B to produce a
homogenous product (Q) which is sold at the output market locating at C. The
location triangle in Figure 1 illustrates the location problem of oligopolistic firms. In
figure 1, the distance a and b and the angle γ are known; h is the distance between the
plant location (E) and the output market (C); z1 and z2 are the distances of plant
location (E) from A and B, respectively; θ is the angle between CA and CE.
(b) Firms make Cournot-Nash conjectures about their rivals’ production and location
decisions and enter the industry without any restrictions until there is no economic
profit. Assume also that equilibra are symmetric. Thus, we can neglect the location
dispersion of firms and focus on the impact of the specific commodity tax on the
production and location decisions of a representative firm.
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Figure 1. The Weber Triangle

(c) The production function is homothetic and can be specified as:
q = f(m1, m2)

(1)

with fm1 ≡ ∂q/∂m1 > 0, fm2 ≡ ∂q/∂m2 > 0, fm1m1 ≡ ∂2q/∂m12 < 0, and
fm2m2 ≡ ∂2q/∂m22 < 0.
(d) The industry inverse demand function for output is given by
P = P(Q)

(2)

where Q = ∑qi is the market quantity demanded, PQ ≡ ∂P/∂Q < 0, PQ + qPQQ < 0,
N
cf. HM (1992, p. 256). It should be noted that ∑ denotes ∑ .
i=1
(e) The prices of inputs and output are evaluated at the plant location (E). The cost of
purchasing inputs is the price of input at the source plus the freight cost, and the price
of output is the market price minus the freight cost.
(f) Transportation rates are constant.
(g) The government imposes a specific tax which can be specified as:
T = tq

(3)

where t = the specific tax rate, 1 > t > 0.
(h) The objective of each firm is to find the optimum location and production within the
Weber triangle which maximizes the profit.
With these assumptions, the profit maximizing location problem of the representative
firm is given by
max Π = [P(Q)-rh]f(m1, m2) – (w1+r1z1)m1 – (w2+r2z2)m2 – tf(m1, m2)
2

(4)

where z1 = (a2 + h2 – 2ahcosθ)1/2, z2 = [b2 + h2 – 2bhcos(-θ)]1/2; w1 and w2 are the base
prices of m1 and m2 at their sources A and B; r, r1 and r2 are constant transportation rates
of q, m1, m2; z1, z2, and h are the distances from the plant location to the source location
A, B and the market location C. It is worth mentioning that q, m1, m2, h and θ are choice
variables and a, b, t, , w1, w2, r, r1, r2 are positive parameters.
Assuming that the oligopolistic firm treats q instead of m1 and m2 as a decision
variable, we first derive the cost function by minimizing total cost subject to a given
output at a given location,
min L = (w1+r1z1)m1 – (w2+r2z2)m2 + [q – f(m1, m2)]

(5)

where  is the Lagrange multiplier; q, h and θ are parameters. Using the standard
comparative static analysis and the envelope theorem, we can show that the production
function is homothetic if and only if the production cost function is separable in the sense
that
C(q; h, θ) = c(w1+r1z1, w2+r2z2)H(q)

(6)

where c is a function of the delivered prices of m1 and m2, e.g. Takayama (1993,
Proposition 3.5., pp. 147-148). Hence, the average cost and marginal cost can be written
as:
AC = C(q; h, )/q = c(.)H(q)/q
MC = Cq = c(.)Hq

(7)
(8)

where Cq ≡ ∂(q; h, )/∂q and Hq ≡ dH(q)/dq.
Following Hanoch (1975), from (7) and (8), we obtain the following relation:
H(q)/q > (=) < Hq

(9)

if the production function exhibits increasing (constant) or decreasing returns to scale.
Substituting the production cost function C = C(q; h, ) into (4), we obtain the profit
as a function of q, θ and h. The first-order condition for a maximum would be
∂Π/∂q = [(P + PQq) – rh] – c(.)Hq – t = 0
∂Π/∂θ = - cθH(q) = 0
∂Π/∂h = - rq – chH(q) = 0

(10)
(11)
(12)

where cθ ≡ ∂c(.)/∂θ, ch ≡ ∂c(.)/∂h. Assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied
and the possibility of the corner solution is excluded; cf. Kusumoto (1986) and Mai and
Hwang (1992). We can solve (10)-(12) for q, θ and h when free entry is prohibited.
If free entry is allowed, each firm in the industry earns normal profit only. The
following condition must be satisfied.
Π = [P(Nq) – rh]q – c(.)H(q) – tq = 0

(13)
3

If there is an interior solution, we can solve equations (10) – (13) for q, θ, h and N in
terms of t and v = (a, b, γ, w1, w2, r1, r2, r), where v is a vector of remaining parameters.
q = q(t, v),

θ = θ(t, v), h = h(t, v), N = N(t, v)

(14)

The expressions for the partial derivatives such as ∂q/∂t, ∂θ/∂t, ∂h/∂t and ∂N/∂t can be
obtained by applying the standard comparative static analysis. It is of interest to note
that the production function must exhibit increasing returns to scale for (10) – (13) to
have a solution as in (14). To see this, we divide both sides of equation (13) by q and
obtain
[P(Nq) – rh] = [c(.)H(q)/q] – t

(15)

Substituting (15) into (10), we obtain
PQq = c(.)[Hq(q) - H(q)/q]

(16)

Since the left-hand side of (16) is negative, for the right-hand side of (16) to be negative,
the production function must exhibit increasing returns to scale, i.e., H(q)/q > Hq(q) (see
also Hwang, Mai and Shieh, 2007) . It simply implies that in equilibrium all firms
produce on the downward sloping part of the average cost curve under Cournot-Nash
competition with free entry.
This completes our modeling of the basic framework for studying the effects of a
specific tax on the oligopolistic firm’s production and location decisions.
3. Effects of Specific Taxes on Production and Location Decisions
We are now in a position to examine the effects of a change in the specific tax rate on the
optimum output and location. Totally differentiating equations (10)-(13) and applying
Cramer’s rule, we obtain the following results.
(∂θ/∂t) = (-1/D4)PQQq3Πθhch{[H(q)/q] – Hq}
(∂h/∂t) = (1/D4)PQQq3Πθθch{[H(q)/q] – Hq}
(∂q/∂t) = (-D2/D4)PQQq3
(∂N/∂t) = (q/D4)(D2{[2PQ + PQQq – c(.)Hqq] + (N - 1)PQQq} – ΠθθΠqh2)
(∂Q/∂t) = N(∂q/∂t) + q(∂N/∂t)
= (q/D4){D2q[2PQ – c(.)Hqq] – ΠθθΠqh2}

(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)

where Πθh = - chθH(q), Πθθ = - cθθH(q), Πqq = (N + 1)PQ + NPQQq – cHqq, Πq = PQq(N –
1), Πqh = ch{[H(q)/q] – Hqq}, D2 = ΠθθΠhh - Πθh2 and D4 is the relevant Hessian
determinant. It should be noted that Πθθ < 0, D2 > 0 and D4 > 0 by the stability
conditions, ch < 0 can be seen from equation (12) and [H(q)/q] – Hq > 0 is due to
increasing returns to scale.
It is clear that the signs of (∂θ/∂t), (∂h/∂t) and (∂q/∂e) crucially depend upon the shape
of market demand function. In the case where the market demand function is linear, i.e.,
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PQQ = 0. From (17) – (19), we obtain (∂q/∂t) = 0, (∂θ/∂t) = 0 and (∂h/∂t) = 0. Thus, we
can conclude that
Proposition 1. The optimum output and location of an oligopolistic firm is independent
of a change in the specific tax if the demand function is linear.
The economic interpretation behind Proposition 1 is given as follows. A change in the
specific tax does not change the slope of the demand curve at any output level but will
increase the output price in equilibrium for the oligopolistic firms to break even. In the
case where the demand function is linear, i.e., PQQ = 0, a higher output price will not alter
the slope of demand curve and so the required tangency between demand curve and
average cost curve occurs at the same output level for each firm, i.e., (∂q/∂t) = 0. Since
the output per firm remains unchanged, the optimum location will remain the same.
Next, we consider the case where the demand function is not linear, i.e., PQQ ≠ 0.
Since the signs of PQQ and Πθh can not a priori be determined, the signs of (∂q/∂t), (∂θ/∂t)
and (∂h/∂t) in (17) - (19) are ambiguous. However, from (18) and (19), we can obtain
(∂q/∂t) < ( >) 0, as PQQ > (<) 0
(∂h/∂t) > (<) 0, as PQQ > (<) 0

(22)
(23)

Thus, we can conclude that
Proposition 2. An increase in the specific tax will increase (decrease) the output of an
oligopolistic firm and will move its plant location closer to (farther away from) the CBD
if the demand function is concave (convex).
The impact of the specific commodity tax on the output per firm is consistent with B1.
The economic intuition underlying Proposition 2 is given as follow. An increase in the
specific tax rate does not change the slope of the demand curve at any output level but
will increase the output price in equilibrium for firms to break even. In the case where
the demand function is concave (i.e., PQQ < 0), a higher output price decreases the
absolute value of the slope of the demand curve and so the point of tangency between
demand curve and average curve occurs at a larger output level for each firm. Since the
production function exhibits increasing returns to scale, the quantity of inputs, m1 and m2,
per unit of output declines, then the resources pull decreases while the market pull
increases. As a result, the optimum location moves towards the CBD. In the case where
the demand function is convex (i.e., PQQ > 0), the opposite applies.
Next, we turn to the effect of a change in the specific tax on equilibrium number of
undifferentiated oligopolistic firms. From equation (20), we can see the sign of (∂N/∂t)
can not be a priori determined because [2PQ + PQQq – c(.)Hqq]D2 < 0, - ΠθθΠqh2 > 0 and
the sign of (N-1)PQQq2 can be either positive or negative depending on the shape of
demand function. We can show
(∂N/∂t) > (<) 0, as - D2{[2PQ + PQQq – c(.)Hqq] + (N - 1)PQQq} > (<) – ΠθθΠqh2
Thus, we can conclude that
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(24)

Proposition 3. An increase in the specific commodity tax may increase the number of
undifferentiated firms even if the demand function is linear or concave.
This result is significantly different from that of Besley (1989, p. 363) in the non-spatial
setting.
The different results are due to the location effect, ΠθθΠqh2 = - cθθH(q)
{ch[H(q)/q]-Hq}2. It shows that the firm will change its plant location after the change of
the specific commodity tax. If the location effect dominates the output effect, the number
of firms may increase.
Finally, we consider the effect of an increase in the commodity specific tax on the
total output of oligopoly. From equation (21), we obtain
(∂Q/∂t) < (>) 0, as - D2q[2PQ – c(.)Hqq] > (< ) – ΠθθΠqh2

(25)

Thus, we can conclude that
Proposition 8. An increase in the specific tax may increase total output of
undifferentiated oligopoly.
This result is also significantly different from that of Besley (1989, p. 363). Once again
the different results are due to the location effect.
4. Concluding Remarks
We examine the impact of a specific commodity tax on the production and plant location
decisions of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms with free entry. In the case where the
demand function is linear, we show that an increase in the specific commodity tax does
not change the location decision and output of an oligopolistic firm. In the case where
the demand function is not linear, we show that an increase in the specific tax will cause
each firm’s output to rise (fall) and move the plant location closer to (farther away from)
the output market if the demand function is concave (convex). These results indicate
that B1 holds in the Weber triangular location model.
In the case where the demand function is linear or concave, we show that an increase
in the specific commodity tax may increase the number of firms and total output of
oligopoly. This result is significantly different from B2 and B3. It indicates that the
location decision has very important influence on the impact of a change in the specific
commodity tax on the number of firms and total output of oligopoly with free entry.
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